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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
OGDEN CITY, a Municipal Corpora-
tion, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FERRELL H. ADAMS, State Trea-
surer of Utah, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7779 
Inasmuch as plaintiff has included in its Statement 
of Facts certain information which is not contained in 
the pleadings, defendant deems it advisable to make a 
separate Statement of Facts. 
In the interest of clarity and to arrive at the true 
state of facts upon which the Court 1nust determine this 
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case, Defendant will follow Plaintiff's Statement of 
Facts. 
1. In paragraph 1, page · 1, Plaintiff's Brief, 
Plaintiff points out that during the period of J\iarch 
31, 1951, to August 27, 1951, five criminal actions, 
each with more than one defendant, for violation of Sec-
tion 46-0-237, Utah Code Annotated 1943, were prose-
cuted in Weber County, State of Utah. Said criminal 
actions were successfully prosecuted and substantial 
funds resulted as fines and forfeitures. There is no 
evidence in the record as to the other facts contained in 
said paragraph L 
2. All fines and forfeitures in the criminal cases 
have been sent to the Defendant herein, and the Defend-
ant now has the same in his possession and control. 
3. The Plaintiff, pursuant to Section 46-0-219, ob-
tained certificates from the Judges who presided at the 
hearings at each of the criminal cases. The (;;ertificates 
of the Judges, in each case, read in part as follows: 
TO THE STATE TREASURER OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH: 
I, --------------------------------, one of the Judges of the 
District Court of 1lveber County, State of Utah, 
hereby certify: 
1. That the prosecution of the above entitled 
case was initiated by officers of Ogden City, and 
the evidence was obtained by and at the expense 
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of said Ogden City, and officers of Ogden City 
assisted in the successful prosecution of said case, 
and as provided by Section 46-0-219, Utah Code 
Annotated, 19±3, all fines, forfeitures or costs 
paid to yqu as the result of said prosecution 
should be paid to Ogden City. 
2. It is therefore recon1mended that all fines, 
forfeitures, and costs received by you in this case 
be paid to Ogden City. 
Dated this---------------- day of September, 19,51. 
Judge 
I, the Chairman of the Utah State Liquor 
Commission, hereby approve the payment of all 
fines, forfeitures and costs received in the above 
entitled case to Ogden City. 
Chairman 
Utah State Liquor Commission 
(Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) 
It is to be noted that the Judge in each case certified 
that "officers of Ogden City assisted in the successful 
prosecution of said case" and made a recommendation 
that the fines, forfeitures and costs be paid to Ogden 
City. 
4. The Chairman of the Utah State Liquor Control 
Commission, in writing approved the payment of all said 
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fines, forfeitures and costs to Ogden City. (Exhibits 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5.) 
5. 'l_lhere 1s no evidence in the record as to any 
hearing had by the Judges of the District Court of 
Weber County before issuing of the certificates. 
6. Certificates of the various Judges of the Second 
Judicial District Court state that the various criminal 
cases were initiated by officers of Ogden City, and it is 
a fair inference that all of the defendants in said cases 
were bound over to the District Court for trial. How-
ever, as to the other facts contained in paragraph 6 
of Plaintiff's Brief, there is no evidence in the record. 
7. There is no evidence in the record as to what 
assistance the attorneys for Ogden City may have given 
the District Attorney in the prosecution of the various 
criminal cases set forth in paragraph 3 of Plaintiff's 
complaint, nor is there any evidence concerning how 
much work the District Attorney had to do in preparing 
and prosecuting the cases. 
8. Demand has been made by the plain tiff on the 
defendant for remittance to it of all fines and forfeitures 
he has received from the five criminal cases, and the 
defendant has refused to mak€ said remittance. 
9. Certain additional facts have been pleaded into 
the record by the defendant in this case which briefly 
are as follows: 
(j 
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On Decmnber 9, 1938, the then State Auditor J·ay 
\Y. Guy requested an opinion fron1 the IIonorable Joseph 
Chez, Attorney General of the State of Utah, concerning 
an interpretation of Chapter -!3, Section 177, Laws of 
rtah 1935, which i::; nmY codified as 46-0-219 Utah Code 
Annotated 19-!3 (Exhibit 6). In response to this request, 
the Attorney General issued a series of three. opinions, 
Exhibits 7, 8 and 9, interpreting the provisions of Sec-
tion -!6-0-:219. Defendant has also alleged (which for the 
purpose of this case n1ust be taken as true), that the 
Defendant and his predecessors in office have at no time 
refunded any fines and forfeitures imposed under fu.e 
Liquor Control Act by District Courts of the State of 
Utah. Defendant has also alleged, that the cities, towns 
and counties of the State of Utah have acquiesced in the 
interpretation of the Attorney General of Section 46-0-
219 Utah Code Annotated 1943, continuously since the 
year 1939. It is submitted that upon this limited set of 
facts, and such facts as the Court may take judicial 
notice of, are the factual basis for a determination here-
in. 
STATEl\!lENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE WORDING OF SECTION 46-0-219 UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1943, IS SO AMBIGUOUS AS TO REQUIRE 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND BY THE EXPRESS 
WORDS OF SAID SECTION IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO BE PAID THE FINES IN 
DEFENDANT'S HANDS. 
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POINT II. 
WHILE OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ARE 
NOT CONTROLLING, THEY ARE ENTITLED TO GREAT 
RESPECT IN CONSTRUING AN AMBIGUOUS STATUTE. 
POINT III. 
OGDEN CITY IS A CITY OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AND AS SUCH HAS ACQUIESCED IN THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 46-0-219 UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1943. 
POINT IV. 
THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF UTAH HAS 
ACQUIESCED IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTRUCTION 
PLACED UPON SECTION 46-0-219 UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED 1943. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE WORDING OF SECTION 46-0-219 UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1943, IS SO AMBIGUOUS AS TO REQUIRE 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND BY THE EXPRESS 
WORDS OF SAID SECTION IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO BE PAID THE FINES IN 
DEFENDANT'S HANDS. 
Section 46-0-219 Utah Code Annotated 1943, reads 
as follows: 
All fines and forfeitures levied under this act 
shall be paid to the state treasurer and credited 
to the general fund; provided, however, that in all 
cases where violations of this act are prosecuted 
to a conviction by the officer of any town, city or 
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county the judge of the court wherein such pro-
secution took place shall certify to the state 
treasurer that such prosecution was conducted 
by the officers of such town, city or county, 
and the state treasurer, on the written approval 
of the chairnmn of the counnission, shall pay to 
said town, city or county all an1ounts collected 
as fines, forfeitures or costs as the result of such 
prosecution. 
There are two phrases in the foregoing section which, 
we submit, are so mnbiguous as to require statutory 
interpretation. The phrase "prosecuted to a conviction 
by the officer of any town, city or county" and the phrase 
"prosecution was conducted by the officers of such town, 
city or county" give rise to the ambiguity in Section 
46-0-219 Utah Code Annotated 1943. There can be no 
doubt under the terms of the statute that all fines and 
forfeitures levied under the Liquor Control Act should 
be paid to the State Treasurer and credited to the gen-
eral fund. It is only which fines should be returned to 
the towns, cities and counties by the State Treasurer 
that is not clearly spelled out. Plaintiff asserts that the 
defendant "refuses to agree that it [the statute] means 
what it says when it provides that "all" fines growing out 
of local prosecution (without restriction as to the court 
of origin) shall be repaid to the local unit." If Section 
46-0-219 Utah Code Annotated 1943 made such a pro-
vision as the plaintiff asserts; i.e., that all fines growing 
out of local prosecutions should be returned to the local 
unit, this controversy would not and could not have 
arisen. It is only in "all cases where violations of this 
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Act are prosecuted to a conviction by the officer of any 
town, city or county • • *" that the fines and forfeitures 
shall be returned to the local unit. Had the Legislature 
intended to have all fines and forfeitures returned to the 
local subdivisions when the officers of the local units 
initiated the prosecution or appeared as witnesses in 
the criminal cases, or, if such officers were associated 
in the successful prosecution of the criminal cases, it 
would have been, we submit, a simple matter to so pro-
vide. The Legislature, however, did not so provide and 
therefore it must be determined what the intention of 
the Legislature was when it provided that fines should 
be returned "in all cases w.here violations of this Act 
are prosect(,ted to a conviction by the officer of any town, 
city or county." 
From a reading of certain sections of the Liquor 
Control Act it would appear that the Legislature intend-
ed that city attorneys would prosecute violations of the 
Liquor Control Act in the city courts. Section 46-0-206 
provides in part : 
If any district, county, city or town attorney, 
or any peace officer, or any other person has 
probable cause to believe that alcoholic bever-
ages are possessed, 1nanufactured, sold, bartered, 
given away or otherwise furnished in violation 
of this act, or are kept for the purpose of selling, 
bartering or giving away or otherwise furnishing 
the same in violation of law, it shall be the duty 
of such attorney, peace officer or person forth-
with to make and file with the judge of the district 
10 
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or eit~: court, -or any eity, town or precinct justice 
of the peace, written infonnation supported. by 
his oath or affinnation that he has information 
and reason to believe that this act is being vio-
lated at a certain plaee, stating the facts within 
his k~owledge: and he shall describe as particu-
larly as may be the place, and the names of the 
persons, if known, participating in such unlawful 
act. • • • 
The concluding sentence In the foregoing section 
provides: 
Any peace officer who shall.-make a seizure of 
alcoholic beverages or any other property under 
the provisions of this act shall forthwith report 
in writing, on forms supplied by the commission, 
to the prosecuting attorney of the city or county 
in which such seizure was made, and also to the 
commission, with detailed information as to the 
property seized and persons arrested, and the 
address of the place fron1 which such property 
was seized. 
This section contemplates, at least, that the com-
lnencement of searches and seizures of property pur-
suant to the Liquor Control Act, can be initiated by a 
city or town attorney in a city court or before town or 
city justices of the peace. Section 46-0-210 Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, terminates the jurisdiction of. the city 
court or justice of the peace when it appears that tangi-
ble personal property was seized by an officer and the 
city court or Justice of the peace must certify the record 
and all files to the District Court of th~ county in which 
the premises are situated for further proceedings. 
11 
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Section 46-0-216 provides in part as follows:· 
"All inspectors appointed under this aet, and 
all sheriffs, deputy sheriffs,. mayors, city judges, 
justices of the peace, constables, marshals and 
peace officers, and all district county, city and 
town attorneys, and clerks of courts shall dili-
gently enforce the provisions of this act. * * ~ 
(Italics added). 
and also 
* * * * 
"Immediately upon conviction of any person 
in any town, city or county for violation of any 
provisions of this Act, or for violation of any city 
ordinace relating to alcoholic beverages, it shall 
be the duty of the clerk of the court or the justice 
of the peace to notify the comission of such con-
viction, giving in writing full particulars of the 
case on forms supplied by the commission * * * ." 
(Italics added). 
The above quoted portions of Section 46-0-216 Utah 
Code Annotated 1943, would seem to indicate that the 
Legislature intended that city attorneys would prosecute 
violations of the provisions of the Liquor Control Act 
in the city courts, in which case the fines could be re-
turned to the city. 
Sections 46-0-24 7 and 248 impose the duty of en-
forcenlent of the Liquor Control Act on all city, posecut-
-ing and peace officers. The Legislature, in these two 
sections, we sub1nit, assun1e that a city prosecuting offi-
cer was different than a city peace officer. 
12 
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'Vhile the foregoing quoted sections do not spell 
out a clear cut procedure insofar as city attorneys and 
city courts are concerned, we sub1nit that the Legislature 
contemplated that the violations of the Liquor Control 
Act could be prosecuted by a city attorney and thus 
Section 46-0-219 is not a nullity as far as the cities and 
towns are concerned. The Legislature contemplated 
that control of the possession, sale and transportation ·of 
alcoholic beverages would be enforced . by the Liquor 
Control Conm1ission. Section 46-0-48 (e) imposes such 
duty on the Liquor Control Commission and this fact 
is not altered by the abolition of the Liquor Commis-
sion's enforcement unit by executive fiat. The Legisla-
ture also imposed the duty of enforcement of the Liquor 
Control Act upon all city, county, precinct and state exe-
cutive, prosecuting and peace officers. Plaintiff's asser-
tion that the enforcement of criminal laws must be made 
financially worth while to legal subdivisions of the State, 
we submit, is without basis in reason, or in fact. All such 
officers are bound by the statutes and by their oaths 
of office to enforce the laws and to say that such local 
units must be reimbursed under Section 46-0-219 Utah 
Code Annotated 1943, in order to make them more en-
thusiastic about expending their money and time and 
efforts in Liquor Control activities is a fiction which this 
state should not, and cannot adopt. 
Plaintiff asserts that the Legislature has set forth 
three controlling factors in the matter of remittance of 
fines and forfeitures: (1) Prosecution to a conviction 
by officers of a town, city o·r county; (2) Certifieation 
13 
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of that fact to the State Treasurer by the Judge of the 
court wherein such prosecution took place; and (3) \Vrit-
ten approval by the Chair1nan of the Liquor Conuriission 
of the 'remittance to the town, city or county of said fines 
and forfeitures. We think this is a fair interpretation of 
the statute.' However, we submit that the Attorney Gen-
·eral's opinion that fines imposed by the District Courts 
is only a test which the Attorney General advised the 
auditor to use in 1naking his examinations, and that if a 
violation of the Liquor Control Act is prosecuted in a 
district court of the State of Utah that such prosecution 
cannot and is not "prosecuted to a conviction by the offi-
cers of a town, city or county. 
The plaintiff asserts that the defendant admits that 
condition No.2 has been cmnplied with. Such, we submit, 
is not the case. The defendant in paragraph 4 of his An-
-swer, denied that the several Judges of the Court where-
in such prosecutions took place certified to the defendant 
that such prosecutions were conducted by the officers 
of Ogden City. The defendant alleged that the Judges 
-of the District Court wherein the prosecutions took place 
executed certificates that the officers of Ogden City as-
sisted in the successful prosecution of the cases and in-
c~uded as exhibits Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 copies of the 
·said certificates. 
It can, we believe, be fairly assumed that grave 
doubts existed in the minds of the various District Court 
,Judges as to whether the officers . of Ogden City did 
prosecute these cases to a conviction. The certificate 
14 
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with regard to the initiating of the cases by officers of 
Ogden City, and with regard to the evidence being ob-
tained by, and at the expense of Ogden City is a nullity 
under the plaintiff's theory of the case. Such certification 
as to these 1natters need not have been made. The only 
thing which the Court need certify to is "that such prose-
cution was conducted by the officers of said town, city or 
county • • * ." 'Ve submit that the plaintiff must fail in 
this action if for no other reason than that the Certificate 
of the Distriet Court Judges does not properly certify 
that the conviction was conducted by the officers of 
Ogden City. Such certificate, on its face, merely states 
that the officers of Ogden City assisted in the success-
ful prosecution of the case and this, we submit, is not 
sufficient. Fundamentally, however, it will be of great 
assistance if the Court will decide the issue which was 
intended to be presented, and and give a judicial inter-
pretation of the words "prosecuted to a conviction" and 
"prosecution was conducted by the office·rs of said town, 
city or county." It is submitted that the only practical 
interpretation which can be placed upon these words is 
the interpretation which the Attorney General arrived 
at in 1939 which is that if a violation of the Liquor Con-
trol Act is prosecuted in the District Court, that of 
necessity such prosecution was conducted by the District 
Attorney who is a state officer and not an officer of 
any town, city or county. 
POINT II. 
WHILE OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ARE 
NOT CONTROLLING, THEY ARE ENTITLED TO GREAT 
RESPECT IN CONSTRUING AN AMBIGUOUS STATUTE. 
15 
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Admittedly any opinion of the Attorney General, 
no Inatter of how long a standing, is not binding upon the 
Court. liowever, we subinit that the Court should give 
great weight to the opinions of the Attorney General 
which in this case, have been consistently followed for a 
period in excess of thirteen years. rrhe r nited States 
Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Badger v. Hoi-
dale, 88 F. (2d) 208, 109 ALR 798, considered the weight 
which should be given to an opinion of the attorney gene-
ral with regard to the interpretation to be given an 
mnendment to the l\1:innesota Constitution and held: 
"* * * This opinion is, of course, not binding 
on this court, but it is entitled to great respect and 
should not be departed from lightly. Standard 
Computing Scale Co. v. Farrell (D.C.) 242 F. 87." 
The court further stated with regard to a statement 
of the attorney general concerning the amendment: 
"This statement, furnished by the Attorney 
General in the performance of his public duty, is 
entitled to consideration. Yosemite Lumber Co. 
v. Industrial Ace. Comm., 187 Cal. 774, 204 P. 226, 
20 ALR 994; Beneficial Loan Society v. Haight, 
215 Cal. 506, 11 P. (2d) 857; Bearden v. Collins, 
220 Cal. 759, 32 P. (2d) 604." 
True it is that the opinions of the Attorney General 
do not cite any authority, and there was some uncertainty 
in the mind of the State Auditor when the opinions were 
written. flowever, in the last opinion of the Attorney 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
General, issued April 18, 1939, (Exhibit 9), the Attor-
ney General stated : 
"No payrnent 1nay be made to a town, city 
or county under the provisions of said section 
177 for the reason that the prosecuting officer-of 
the town, city or county, appeared in the court 
to prosecute the case." 
The Attorney General took the view that where a 
prosecution was conducted in the district courts that 
the district attorney was prosecuting the case and that 
anyone appearing in the district court would be appear-
ing on behalf of the district attorney. Such interpreta-
tion of the statute, we submit, gives various officials who 
must be guided by the statute a clean cut practical inter-
pretation of the statute. The various court clerks, city, 
county and state auditors and the state treasurer must, 
of necessity, have some guide to follow. This, we submit, 
was what the Attorney General attempted to give them 
and that even though no authority was cited by the At-
torney General, we submit that his reasoning was sound 
and should not be lightly overturned. A number of situa-
tions might be envisioned whereby the state treasurer 
or a judge having to decide the matter in order to make 
his certificate would be in grave doubt as to who prose-
cuted the case if the broad, liberal interpretation asserted 
by the plaintiff herein were followed; that is if the word 
"prosecuted" was intended by the Legislature to mean 
any assistance given to the district attorney in the prose-
cution of the case. For instance, if an inspector of the 
Liquor Control Commission requested the aid of city 
17 
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peace officers and the county sheriff in conducting a raid 
on an establishment where it was known that liquor was 
being sold, it would then be necessary for all of the peace 
·officers conducting the raid to appear as witnesses-as 
prosecuting witnesses-in conducting the prosecution to 
final conviction. Now, can it be said that the officer of 
any particular political subdivision conducted the prose-
cution to a conviction? \Ve submit not. The only appro-
priate test which should be applied as to whether the 
fine shall be returned to the political subdivisions or not 
is to consider the Court in which such prosecutions took 
place, and to consider who in fact conducted the prose-
cution. Insofar as prosecutions in the district court, we 
submit that the district attorney by law and by custom 
is the ·one who conducts the prosecution to final convic-
tion. Admittedly a situation might arise whereby the 
officers of a county could prosecute to final conviction 
in the district court, a violation of the Liquor Control 
Act. SuCh a situation might be where a sheriff of a 
county makes an arrest pursuant to the provisions of 
the Liquor Control Act, the county attorney conducts 
the preli~inary hearing before the magistrate and then, 
at the request of the district attorney, prosecutes the vio-
lation to conviction. In such a situation, the fines or 
forfeitures collected in the case should properly be re-
turned to the county. 
In view of the broad duty imposed on city attorneys 
by provisions of the Liquor Control Act, it is submitted 
that a city attorney could, with permission of the county 
and district attorney prosecute to a conviction a viola-
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tion of the Liquor Control Act both before the con1mitting 
n1agistrate and on appeal, or trial in the district court. 
These situations have not, insofar as the record shows, 
ever arisen in the State of Utah and certainly at the time 
the forn1er Attorney General wrote his opinion, he con-
templated that all prosecutions for violations of the 
Liquor Control Act which were prosecuted in the district 
court would be under the direction of the district attor-
ney. \Ve submit, therefore, that the interpretation which 
should be given this statute, at least insofar as the dis-
trict courts are concerned, is that unless it be made to 
appear by the certificate of the Judge of the District 
Court that the city attorney prosecuted the violation of 
the Liquor Control Act to a convicJtion in his court, that 
it must be assumed that the prosecution was conducted 
by the district attorney and the fines cannot be remitted 
to the city. This would be true even though city peace 
officers as distinguished from the city prosecuting offi-
cer appeared as a witness in the prosecution. 
POINT III. 
OGDEN CITY IS A CITY OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AND AS SUCH HAS ACQUIESCED IN THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 46-0-219 UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1943. 
The defendant has alleged (which for the purpose 
of this decision must be taken as true) that at no time 
have any fines or forfeitures imposed by the district 
courts of the State of Utah been refunded and that the 
cities and towns and counties of the State of Utah have 
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acquiesced in the interpretation placed on the said sec,. 
tion by the attorney general. This, we submit, is a con~ 
temporaneous interpretation of the statutes and is en-
titled to great weigth. The rule is set forth in 50 Am. 
J -qr., 309, Section 319, as follows : 
"It has been said that the best construction 
of a statute is that which it has received from 
contemporary authority. 'Optima est legum inter 
pres consuetudo.' In any event, if there is am-
biguity in the .language, the understanding and 
application of it when the statute first comes into 
operation, sanctioned by long acquiescence on the 
part of the legislature and judicial tribunals, are 
the strongest evidence that it has been rightly ex-
plained in practice. The practical construction 
given a statute for a long period of time has been 
considered strong evidence of the 1neaning of the 
law. Such contemporaneous or practical construc-
tion is treated by the courts as of importance, and 
is entitled to great weight, respect, and persua-
sive influence. Indeed, the practical construction 
of a statute, or the meaning publicly given it by 
contemporary usage, is usually presumed to be the 
true one. * * *" 
This rule was recognized by the Utah Supreme Court 
in the case of E. C. Olsen Company v. State Tax Commis-
sion, 109 Utah 563, 168 P. (2d) 324. 
Plaintiff has asserted that Ogden City has not ac-
quiesced in the administrative construction placed upon 
Section 46-0-219 Utah Code Annotated 1943. It further 
asserts that Ogden City cannot be bound by other cities. 
The only indication in the record with regard to the 
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acquiescence of Ogden City is the allegation of the de-
fendant that the "towns, cities and counties have ac-
quiesced in such interpretation continuously since the 
year 1939." 'Ye further sub1nit that the Court can take 
judicial notice of the fact that Ogden City is a city of the 
State of Utah. Plaintiff asserts in its brief that as far 
as its counsel has been able to learn that these cases are 
the first cases which Ogden City officers have prosecuted 
in the District Court under the Liquor Control Act. 
\Ve would sub1nit that this inforn1ation is not a part of 
the record in this case and we further submit that it is 
practically in1possible that the peace officers of Ogden 
City would have gone for a period of thirteen years 
without ever 1naking an arrest which resulted in a prose-
cution in the District Court for a violation of the Liquor 
Control Act. The ad1ninistrative construction which the 
defendant has followed in this case, we submit, is the 
only practical construction of the statute and that there 
has been a long well established, well known administra--
tive interpretation in this matter, and that Ogden City 
has acquiesced in the same. 
True it is that before a Court need apply any rules of 
statutory construction, the language of the statute in 
question must be so an1biguous as to require statutory 
construction. In this case there can be little doubt that 
the words "prosecuted to a conviction" are ambiguous. 
Plaintiff has cited no authority which proved helpful 
to the Court in determining what this would mean, and 
the defendant has been unable to find any case directly 
construing such words, or any case which would prove 
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particularly helpful 1n deter1nining what such words 
mean. 
Numerous definitions of the words "prosecution" 
and "prosecuted" are set forth in Volume 34 Words and 
Phrases page 615 et seq. These definitions would seem to 
indicate that the word "prosecution" is a criminal pro-
ceeding at the suit of the government and is conducted 
by a prosecuting attorney. The North Dakota Supreme 
Court in the case of State v. Rozum, 80 N.W. 477, 479; 
8 N.D. 548, had occasion to construe the word "prosecu-
tion" which was used in a statute similar to 46-0-222 Utah 
Code Annotated 1943. In that case the court held: 
''* * * but as used in the statute, the word 
'prosecution' does not mean the making of a com-
plaint merely but means a criminal action." 
We submit, Therefore, that _Ogden City being a city 
of the State of Utah has acquiesced in such interpretation 
of the word "prosecution" for a period in excess of thir-
teen years and that such interpretation should now be 
adopted by this court. 
POINT IV. 
THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF UTAH HAS 
ACQUIESCED IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTRUCTION 
PLACED UPON SECTION 46-0-219 UTAH- CODE ANNO-
TATED 1943. 
S€ction 46-0-219 Utah Code Annotated 1943, was 
first passed by the Legislature in the year 1935 as Sec-
tion 177, Laws of Utah 1935, Chapter 43. No amendment 
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has been n1ade to this section since that time although 
the Legislature has fr01n time to time amended other 
sections of the Liquor Control Act. 
The lT nited States Supren1e Court 1n the case of 
United States Y. Farrar, 281 U. S. 624; 74 L. Ed. 1078, 
had occasion to announce a rule which we submit is ap-
plicable in this case. The Court held as set forth in the 
headnote: 
"The fact that a construction, during a period 
of ten years, by the executive departments 
charged with its administration and enforcement, 
of the provisions of the National Prohibition Act 
relative to the issuance of permits for the pur-
chase of liquor, as not including the ordinary 
purchaser, has been acquiesced in by Congress, 
is evidence of the correctness of such construc-
tion." 
See also Van Dyke's Appeal, 217 Wis. 528; 259 N.W. 
700, wherein the Court held: 
"The inference that an . administrative con-
struction of a state income tax law as warranting 
the inclusion in taxable income of interest on non-
taxable highway improvement bonds is correct 
may be drawn from the failure of the legislature 
during a period of several years to change such 
construction by amending the statute." 
The Legislature of the State of Utah, we submit, 
has acquiesced in the interpretation placed on the statute 
by the Attorney General in 1939, and such acquiescence, 
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while not binding on the Court, should be given great 
weight in the interpretation of. Section 4G-0-219 Utah 
Code Annotated 1943. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the foregoing authorities and argument, 
we submit that this Court should construe the words 
"prosecuted to a conviction" and "prosecution was con-
ducted by the officers of such city, town, or county * * *" 
to mean that only in cases where violations of the Liquor 
Control Act are prosecuted to a conviction by the prose-
cuting attorney of any city, town or county that the fines 
imposed should be remitted to the local unit. 
WHEREFORE, defendant prays that the alterna-
tive writ heretofore issued be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Defendant's Address : 
State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
G. HAL TAYLOR, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant. 
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